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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses AWIRS 95 and IRWIRS 96-7 data to test whether workplaces which 
used ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ Human Resource Management (HRM) policies an practices 
experienced significant differences in labour productivity improvements.  Generally, the 
results support the proposition that management attitudes, policies and practices which 
aim to develop workforce skills, commitment and motivation were positively associated 
with improvements in labour productivity.  Very few ‘hard’ practices other than 
performance pay had the same effect.  EEO/AA and maternity leave policies were 
strongly correlated with improved productivity. 
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THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT HRM REGIMES ON LABOUR 
PRODUCTIVITY: NATIONAL RESULTS AND A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Australian organisations were subject to severe pressures for change in the last decades of 
the 20th century.  The private sector has faced increasing international market competition 
while the public sector has endured a prolonged reform process associated with the ‘small 
government’ philosophy of the Howard Liberal Government.  Both processes have forced 
organisations to undertake changes involving reduced work forces and the introduction of 
new technologies aimed at improving labour productivity (Hodgkinson 2001).  Within 
this process, employee management regimes have also had to change.  Some 
organisations have adopted a sophisticated, coherent set of employment policies and 
practices, while others use a more ad hoc approach, responding to pressures as they arise 
but without any consistent employment policy framework. 
 
There has been an increasing interest in the employee relations literature on the strategic 
role which human resource management (HRM) plays within organisational change.  
HRM is defined as differing from other personnel management approaches because it 
emphasises “the link between managing human resources and business strategy” and 
therefore has an “emphasis on the integration of [employment] policies and practices with 
each other as well as with business strategy” or the development of competitive 
advantage.  A second feature of HRM strategies is that line managers play a key role in 
the management of human resources and thus the attitudes of senior management towards 
employee relations is a key variable in determining which regimes will be found in 
different organisations (Sisson 1994, pp.8-9). 
 
Given the link between HRM and business strategy, it is expected that effective regimes 
will have a direct impact on an organisation’s ‘bottom line’, particularly through 
improved productivity, improved quality of work life and by ensuring legal compliance 
(Kramar, et al. 1997).  More recently, HRM regimes have been discussed in terms of 
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‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ strategies.  The dividing line between the two approaches is inexact.  
Soft HRM strategies are taken to be more collectivist in philosophy and thus include a 
role for union representatives in consultation and participation processes.  They are also 
seen to be more ‘people centred’ and hence attempt to achieve the organisation’s goals 
through increasing the commitment and competence of its workers.  Soft HRM 
organisations would be expected to simultaneously pursue the objectives of improved 
productivity and improved quality of work life (Sisson 1994). This approach involves a 
greater use of teams, total quality management techniques, direct involvement of workers 
in decision-making and investments in human capital to improve skills and multi-skilling 
in workers (Gollan and Davis 2001). 
 
Hard HRM strategies are more individualistic and hence have less tolerance of union 
participation.  Employees are viewed more as a factor of production than a competitive 
asset so that employment policies and practices tend to focus on cost reductions, flexible 
or more insecure employment and the use of individualised payment systems to improve 
organisational performance (Sisson 1994, Hamberger 1995, Deery and Walsh 1999). 
Some analysts, however, anticipate that the ‘hard’ or individual approach would result in 
higher absenteeism and labour turnover but lower levels of strikes and stop-works and 
lower investments in human capital (Sisson 1993, Deery and Walsh 1999) than the ‘soft’ 
approach.  It is also suggested that the use of individual mechanisms will be significantly 
higher when management is opposed to the unionisation of their workplace (Gilson and 
Wager 1996).  
  
A number of case studies have demonstrated the beneficial effects of increased employee 
involvement in strategic business decision-making (see Gollan and Davis 2001, Scott-
Ladd 1999, Simmons and Lansbury 1996, Mealor 1996 for examples). There is thus a 
temptation to demonstrate that the relationship holds over a broader range of data.  The 
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (AWIRS) appear to offer the 
opportunity to test this proposition more rigorously.  A number of studies of the 
relationship between workplace performance and different employment relations regimes 
have been undertaken by industrial relations and labour economists.  The relationship 
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between the use of joint consultation mechanisms and four indicators of workplace 
performance - improvements in workplace productivity, making it easier or quicker to 
introduce change, improvements in management-employee relations, and improvements 
in product or service quality – was tested using the 1990 AWIRS Employee Relations 
Management Questionnaire by Alexander and Green 1996.  Hawke and Drago 1998 
tested the relationship between enterprise agreement coverage and various performance 
indicators and Wooden 2000 tested the proposition that the use of enterprise agreements 
was associated with increased productivity using the General Management Questionnaire 
from the 1995 AWIRS survey.  The relationship between the use of direct and 
representative forms of consultation and the introduction of four types of organisational 
change was tested by Hodgkinson 2001 using results from the General Management  
Questionnaire of the 1995 AWIRS and the companion 1996-97 Illawarra Regional 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (IRWIRS). 
 
Overall, while correlations between consultation mechanisms and improved performance 
were found (for example in Alexander and Green 1996 and Hodgkinson 2001), they were 
not always consistent and implied that other factors also significantly influenced whether 
consultations were effective or not.  The studies by Hawke and Drago 1998 and Wooden 
2000 did not find significant relationships between enterprise agreement coverage and 
productivity improvements.  However, it was noted that the AWIRS data format was not 
ideal for examining such relationships due to the ordinal ranking and subjective nature of 
many of the results and the probable presence of indirect and feedback relationships 
among the variables.  Wooden concludes that the analysis does not allow us to reject the 
hypothesis that enterprise bargaining has promoted labour productivity.  The cross-
sectoral nature of the AWIRS data base is also conducive to indeterminate results. 
 
In this study a further attempt is made to analyse the relationship between employment 
policies and practices and labour productivity using the 1995 AWIRS database.  Some 
comparative results from the 1996-97 IRWIRS study will also be presented for the 
Illawarra Region.  In order to extend the previous studies, the involvement of workers in 
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organisational strategies is analysed in terms of the use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ HRM 
strategies as well as the use of different consultation and participation mechanisms.  
 
THE INCIDENCE OF DIFFERENT HRM REGIMES IN AUSTRALIAN AND 
ILLAWARRA WORKPLACES 
 
In this study variables associated with these two approaches to employee relations are 
drawn from the AWIRS95 and IRWIRS (1996-97) General Managers and Employee 
Relations Managers Questionnaires.  They are tested against evaluations of labour 
productivity improvements drawn from Question D.11 of the General Managers 
questionnaire: “How would you describe labour productivity compared with two years 
ago?” 
 
 ‘Soft’ HRM Characteristics: 
 
Firms utilizing ‘soft’ HRM practices to improve productivity would be expected to 
display the following characteristics developed from the AWIRS 95 questionnaires. 
• Higher rates of employment stability (Q.B1) – Employees Relations Management 
Questionnaire (ERM) 
• Lower levels of turnover (Q.A10) and absenteeism (Q.A6) – Workplace 
Characteristics Questionnaire (WC) 
• Higher levels of supervisor training in employee relations (Q.A9) and general staff 
training (Q.C4) – ERM 
• Existence of policies on EEO (Q.L1), paid maternity leave (Q. K4, K5), OH&S 
(Q.J1) – ERM 
• High rating to management- employee relationships (Q.E4), focus on quality 
improvements (Q.E1) and human resources (Q.E1) in corporate strategy – General 
Managers Questionnaire (GM) 
• Provision of information to staff (Q.D24), employee involvement structures in place 
(Q.A17, D7, D30) – ERM 
• Employee orientated objectives for workgroups (Q.D11), JCCs (Q.D19) – ERM 
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• Delegation of authority to committees (Q.D22) – ERM 
• Workers express support (Q.42) and trust (Q.42) for management – Employees 
Questionnaire (EQ). 
 
‘Hard’ HRM characteristics 
 
Firms utilizing ‘hard’ HRM practices to improve productivity would be expected to 
display the following characteristics developed from the AWIRS 95 questionnaires. 
• Higher than average use of outworkers, contractors, and agency workers (Q.11) – WC 
• High levels of dismissals (Q.B16), downsizing involving compulsory dismissals (Q. 
E1, E4), industrial action (Q.H1) – ERM 
• Cultivate a direct relationship with employees (Q.E1) – GM 
• Higher use of direct communications methods with employees (Q.D1) – ERM 
• Higher proportion of issues negotiated individually with employees (Q.P16) – ERM 
• Higher proportion of employees on individual contracts (Q.G8), use of performance 
related pay (Q.M1, M3), share-ownership schemes (Q.M5,M6) – ERM 
• Use of bonus and incentives schemes (Q.19,29) – EQ. 
 
In this study, only the variables from the General Management and Employee Relations 
Management surveys are tested. 
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
Both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ practices are found in Australian workplaces as shown in Table 1.  
The lack of use of individual contracts and the high usage of training schemes are 
indicative of ‘soft’ practices.  However, the low use of performance-based pay schemes, 
share ownership or bonus schemes may result from neglect rather than a decision to avoid 
individual performance incentives.  The preference for ‘hard’ practices is reflected in the 
low presence of quality circles, although other participation mechanisms exist in just 
under half of workplaces.  The preference for hierarchical management line meetings 
rather than direct meetings between employees and senior management is also indicative 
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of ‘hard’ HRM practices.  The dominance of other ‘soft’ practices such as existence of 
EEO/AA policies, OH&S policies and the low level of dismissals and downsizing by 
compulsory redundancy may result from institutional factors rather than a real preference 
by managers for such practices. 
 
Employment practices in the Illawarra were similar to Australia as a whole but generally 
indicate a lower overall use of HRM mechanisms.  There was less use of employment-
based pay schemes and share-ownership options for non-managerial employees.  There 
was also less use of regular meetings down the management line.  These factors may 
reflect a ‘soft’ HRM approach although their lower usage might also result from a failure 
by Illawarra managers to implement HRM policies and practices.  EEO/AA, maternity 
leave and, to a lesser extent, OH&S policies were less likely to be found in Illawarra 
workplaces.  Illawarra workplaces had more downsizing, including compulsory 
redundancy and a higher proportion of workplaces which negotiated pay rates (but not 
work practices) directly with employees.  These results are more consistent with a ‘hard’ 
HRM approach.  Thus, as in Australia, elements of both regimes occurred in the 
Illawarra. 
 
Workgroups, quality circles, joint consultative committees and ad hoc taskforces are the 
most common forms of employee consultation and participation mechanisms in 
Australian workplaces.  As shown above, these can be associated with either ‘soft’ or 
‘hard’ HRM practices.  Thus, it is necessary to look at the objectives of these institutions 
in order to determine how they are associated with different employee management 
approaches. 
 
In this analysis, some comparisons are made with the Illawarra regional survey.  Earlier 
studies (Hodgkinson 2001) indicated that the usage of participation mechanisms was 
lower in that region than in Australia as a whole.  Semi-autonomous workgroups were 
found in 33.8 percent of Illawarra workplaces, quality circles in 16.8 percent, joint 
consultative committees in 28.0 percent and ad hoc taskforces in 28.5 percent of 
workplaces compared with (from Table 1) 43%, 16%, 42% and 46% respectively in 
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Australia as a whole.   This confirms the earlier finding that participation mechanisms 
were used less often in this region.  Consequently and unlike Australia, ‘hard’ HRM 
practices predominate in terms of consultation in the Illawarra. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The ranking of the objectives for establishing work groups / quality circles in Table 2 
show a predominance of corporate orientated factors over employee orientated factors.  
The objective of increasing productivity / efficiency / performance is, of course, the 
ultimate outcome of both HRM regimes.  In 87 percent of cases, the use of these 
mechanisms were thought to have improved workplace performance.  Objectives such as 
improving product / service quality and increasing client satisfaction are more consistent 
with the ‘hard’ approach where workers are viewed as production inputs.  However, 
objectives such as improving employee responsibility / autonomy, increasing employee 
motivation and commitment and increasing job satisfaction are more aligned with the 
indirect or ‘soft’ approach to performance improvement where employees are regarded as 
assets who are major contributors to the firm’s success.  Despite the lower incidence of 
work groups / quality circles in the Illawarra, the objectives for those that did exist 
followed a similar pattern to Australia as a whole.  Indeed, ‘soft’ objectives focused on 
developing the workforce occurred slightly more frequently. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The ranking of objectives for establishing joint consultative committees and taskforces 
shown in Table 3 contain a mixture of economic and employee development factors.  If 
improving efficiency or productivity is taken as applying to both approaches, then 
objectives such as improving communications, increasing job satisfaction and employee 
moral and reducing disputes occur more frequently and are associated with the ‘soft’ 
perspective of viewing employees as company assets.  However, economic objectives 
such as assisting in implementing change, improving quality of service or product and 
helping to introduce new technology are also important and suggest these mechanisms 
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are also used within the ‘hard’ perspective where workers are seen as factors of 
production.  The incidence of joint consultative committees and ad hoc taskforces were 
considerably lower in the Illawarra than Australia as a whole.  Again the objectives of 
these followed a similar pattern although the objectives of improving efficiency or 
productivity and of increasing job satisfaction / employee moral were less common. 
 
This analysis suggests that participation mechanisms are used to achieve both ‘hard’ 
economic and ‘soft’ employee development goals.  Thus a simple analysis based on 
whether participation mechanisms are used or not may not provide much enlightenment 
as to whether different approaches to employee management result in improved 
economic performance.  It is thus necessary to look more closely at the impact of 
management attitudes, policies and practices to employee management in each workplace 
when assessing their impact on workplace performance. 
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 
As in all other studies applying multivariate regression analysis to AWIRS data, this 
study used the logit model from Probit analysis and t-ratios to test for significance at the 
90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels.  The Probit analysis undertaken here requires data 
to be coded on a two scale 0 or 1 measure.  Only those variables where enough 
workplaces had both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ characteristics to provide meaningful results are 
included in the regressions.  Variables where there were significant numbers of missing 
values (no response) have also been excluded.  Thus not all the variables shown in Table 
1 have been included in the regressions. 
 
As conclusively demonstrated in Wooden 2000 using data developed by the Productivity 
Commission (Parham 1999), Australia has experienced a significant and unique 
improvement in labour productivity commencing around 1993, the timing of which 
intuitively implicates industrial relations reform.  Wooden’s study, although it focuses on 
a different question to here, is instructive in highlighting some of the weaknesses which 
affect the reliability of the results when using the 1995 AWIRS, and by implication the 
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IRWIRS data.  However, it is the only available database which provides workplace level 
performance data and industrial relations variables.  
 
As an attitudional survey, results reflect the managers’ subjective measures of 
performance rather than objective performance data.  As such, it is subject to 
measurement errors and response bias.  It also collects data on a five point categorical 
scale which often constrains responses to the middle rather than the polar options.  In this 
paper, only strong polar responses have been used to calibrate the 0 / 1 scale for the 
determining variables in an attempt to overcome this problem.  More particularly, it is 
suggested that reform or change may be introduced more frequently into the worse 
performing rather than the best practice workplaces (Wooden 2000).  This possibility 
must be considered when interpreting the following results. 
  
TEST A – Relationship between Performance Indicators and Management Attitudes 
 
The General Management Questionnaire provides the easiest framework in which to test 
the proposition that different HRM regimes have a differential impact on labour 
productivity compared to two years prior. 
 
The propositions can be stated as ‘Labour productivity was a lot higher than two years 
ago’ as a function of: 
 
• ‘Very good’ rating to managerial-employee relationships (Q.BE4) – expected sign 
positive; 
• ‘Strongly agree’ that quality improvements are more important than reducing labour 
costs (Q.BE1e) – expected sign positive; 
• ‘Strongly agree’ that this workplace make considerable investments in human 
resources (Q.BE1f) – expected sign positive; 
• ‘Strongly agree’ management prefer to deal directly with employees rather than 
through trade unions (Q. BE1b) – expected sign negative. 
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Insert Table 4 here 
 
The results from the test that the consequences of different managerial attitudes towards 
HRM impact on productivity improvements are shown in Table 4.  For Australia, strong 
positive correlations were found between improved labour productivity and ranking 
management – employee relationships as very good and management strongly agreeing 
that it provided considerable resources to human resources management.  These results 
support the argument that management taking a positive attitude to supporting their 
labour force, consistent with ‘soft’ HRM practices are positively related to improving 
labour productivity.  Although statistically insignificant, the signs for the other variables 
are also consistent with the argument that ‘soft’ HRM practices are associated with 
productivity improvement. 
 
The relationship between HRM practice and improvements in productivity is much 
weaker in the Illawarra.  There was a weakly significant positive relationship between 
management agreeing that workplace quality improvements were to be preferred over 
labour cost reductions and improved productivity.  There was also a weakly significant 
negative relationship between management saying it would prefer to deal directly with 
employees (a ‘hard’ HRM attitude) and improvements in labour productivity.  Both these 
results thus support the proposition that managerial attitudes supporting the development 
of their workforce are associated with improvements in labour productivity.  The other 
variables were insignificant in the Illawarra, with one sign consistent with the ‘soft’ HRM 
approach but the other negative and so supporting the ‘hard’ approach. 
 
TEST B – Relationship between Employment Policies and Practices and Performance 
Indicators. 
 
This test uses the same performance indicators as Test A, as a function of: 
 
• Employment stability where more than 3 percent of work force has worked here for 
more than 10 years (Q.CB1g) – expected sign  positive. 
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• All or most supervisors trained in employee relations matters (Q.CA9) – expected 
sign positive. 
• Policies on EEO (Q.CL1), Maternity leave (Q.CK4), and OH&S (Q.CJ1) in place – 
expected sign positive. 
• No employees terminated for reasons other than redundancy (Q.CB16) – expected 
sign positive. 
• No strikes at workplace in past year (Q.CH1a) – expected sign positive. 
• No workers on individual contracts (Q.CG8) – expected sign positive. 
• No non-managerial employees receive performance-based payments (Q.CM1) – 
expected sign positive. 
• No share-ownership schemes for all employees in place (Q.CM5) – expected sign 
positive. 
 
Results from the modeling should show positive signs to indicate ‘soft’ HRM practices 
impact on performance and negative signs to indicate that ‘hard’ HRM practices are 
impacting on performance.  The analysis for Australia as a whole and the Illawarra are 
provided in Table 5 below. 
 
Labour productivity improvements are strongly associated with a number of ‘soft’ HRM 
policies and practices for Australia as a whole.  There are very strong correlations 
between having improved labour productivity and having EEO and maternity leave 
policies in place, while there was a weaker but still positive correlation with having 
OH&S policies in place.  There is also a significant correlation between having had no 
strike over the past year and improved productivity and a weakly significant positive 
correlation with having no non-managerial employees on individual contracts, both 
supporting the ‘soft’ HRM approach.  The only significant negative correlation was 
between having no non-managerial employees receiving performance-based payments 
and improved labour productivity.  This last finding suggests that performance-based 
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payments do lead to improved labour productivity as would be predicted by the ‘hard’ 
HRM approach1.  
 
The majority of the results from the Australian data support the hypothesis that ‘soft’ 
HRM policies and practices are associated with improvements in workplace labour 
productivity.  It is also interesting to note, given the current debate on the introduction of 
broader maternity leave entitlements, the strong positive correlations between having 
EEO and maternity leave policies in place and improved labour productivity.  The 
assumption here is that business would be unlikely to provide maternity leave benefits if 
they did not believe it would result in improved labour productivity. 
 
As has been found previously, the results for the Illawarra are weaker and more 
ambiguous than for Australia.  Nevertheless, the majority of variables where significant 
correlations were found have positive signs and thus support the ‘soft’ HRM approach.  
The strongest significant positive association was between improved labour productivity 
and having had no strikes in the past twelve months.  This is interesting in that the 
Illawarra survey, unlike AWIRS 95, was undertaken as the time of the introduction of the 
new Workplace Relations Act and associated industrial reforms which intensified 
industrial conflict during the time the fieldwork was undertaken.  It was thus expected 
that the Illawarra would show an inflated pattern of industrial disputation compared with 
AWIRS 95 (Markey, et al., 2001, p.13).  As shown in Table 1, the percentage of 
workplaces which had had a strike over the past twelve months was slightly higher in the 
Illawarra (17.5%) compared to Australia (12.3%).  This result thus suggests that utilizing 
‘soft’ HRM practices may help isolate workplaces from strike action. 
 
Other ‘soft’ HRM variables which showed a weaker but positive correlation with labour 
productivity in the Illawarra were employment stability and having no non-managerial 
                                                           
1 Performance pay can take the form of merit payments or bonuses related to the performance of an 
individual, which are clearly ‘hard’ HRM practices or bonuses geared to the performance of a groups such 
as ‘gain-sharing’ schemes which may be associated with ‘soft’ HRM practices including quality circles or 
workgroups (Kessler 1994).  The AWIRS question include all these mechanisms and thus it is not possible 
to distinguish what HRM practices are being reflected.  Thus, in this study, performance pay has been 
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employees on share-ownership schemes.  The Illawarra had a much higher percentage of 
employees which had worked in the same workplace for over 10 years than Australia.  
There was a weak negative association with having had no terminations other than by 
redundancy which suggests that those workplaces which had terminated workers had also 
improved labour productivity, a ‘hard’ HRM practice. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Generally, the majority of signs for employment policy and practice and the significant 
variables found in the Illawarra support the hypothesis that ‘soft’ HRM practices are 
associated with improved labour productivity.  However, the smaller number and weaker 
levels of significance in this region suggest that Illawarra workplaces are less likely to 
associate either HRM practice with improved labour productivity than found for 
Australia as a whole.  Further, both the EEO and maternity leave variables were not 
significant in the Illawarra. 
 
TEST C – Relationship between Labour Productivity and Workplace Participation 
Mechanisms 
 
The results of the test as to whether workplace participation mechanisms were in place 
had an impact on improved labour productivity are shown in Table 6.  All the results for 
the Illawarra were insignificant.  However, weak significant positive correlations were 
found in Australia between improved labour productivity and having work groups and 
taskforces or ad hoc committees in place and a very strong positive correlations existed 
with having quality circles. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
assumed to be associated with ‘hard’ or individualistic HRM practices, although this was not necessarily so 
in all cases. 
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However, as discussed above, the objective of utilizing worker participation may be to 
either improve workplace performance / efficiency / productivity by increasing the work 
effort directly (hard HRM) or to achieve these goals indirectly by improving the 
motivation of workers (soft HRM).  The impact of these different objectives behind the 
use of workgroups or quality circles on improvements in labour productivity is shown in 
Table 7. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
Again, no significant relationships were found in the Illawarra.  However, for Australia as 
a whole, strongly significant positive relationships were found between improved labour 
productivity and ‘soft’ HRM objectives such as team-building, increasing employee 
motivation and commitment and increasing job satisfaction.  A weakly significant 
negative correlation was however found between the objective of increasing employee 
responsibility and autonomy and improved labour productivity.  No significant 
relationships were found for the ‘hard’ HRM objectives.  
 
It was not possible to test the relationships between the different objectives for 
establishing joint consultative committees or taskforces or ad hoc committees in Australia 
due to data difficulties.  However, in the Illawarra, one weakly significant negative 
relationship was found between the objective ‘to assist in implementing change’ and 
improved labour productivity. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper focuses on the proposition that employee consultation and participation 
practices are positively related to improved labour productivity.  However, due to 
institutional factors reflecting the influence of industrial relations legislation and trade 
union presence, many workplaces will utilize participation mechanisms without 
necessarily embracing the philosophy that employee consultation and participation results 
in improved workplace performance.  To delve below the surface of the institutional 
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approach, this study focuses on management attitudes, policies and practices towards 
their workforces in order to determine whether these have a differential impact on 
performance in the form of improved labour productivity. 
 
These attitudes, policies and practices have been categorised into two human resource 
management (HRM) typologies: ‘soft’ and ‘hard’.  Soft HRM practices are associated 
with a managerial philosophy that a workplace’s workforce constitutes a strategic asset 
which needs to be developed as a source of competitive advantage for the business.  Hard 
HRM practices reflect the managerial philosophy that the workforce should be viewed as 
a cost of production such that practices generally aimed at reducing labour costs or 
increasing labour effort are the main means of improving workplace performance, 
although these may be implemented through worker consultation and participation 
mechanisms.  In this study, attitudes, policies and practices associated with both 
approaches are assumed to have the objective of improving labour productivity.  The 
study attempts to assess whether observable differences are achieved depending on which 
HRM approach is used. 
 
Of the various workplace indicators available, improved labour productivity is probably 
the one most amenable to human resource management practices.  Thus some causal 
relationship between differences in HRM practices and improvements in labour 
productivity could be expected.  The results for Australia as a whole strongly support the 
proposition that ‘soft’ HRM policies and practices have a positive impact on improved 
labour productivity.  The presence of all participation mechanisms other than joint 
consultative committees were correlated with improved productivity.  The proposition 
that senior management taking a positive attitude to supporting their workforce is 
associated with improved labour productivity is supported from the results shown in 
Table 4.  Further, there are significant positive correlations between implementing ‘soft’ 
HRM policies and practices and improving labour productivity as shown in Table 5. 
 
The results from the Illawarra survey were much less conclusive in that fewer significant 
results were found.  Nevertheless, the majority of those that did occur also support the 
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proposition that ‘soft’ HRM attitudes, policies and practices are associated with improved 
labour productivity.  The predominance of insignificant results may indicate that 
Illawarra managers have neglected HRM strategies as a means of improving workplace 
performance.  Given that, as discussed in Markey, et al. 2001, Illawarra workplaces 
generally performed below that of Australia, a greater use of HRM strategies and 
particularly ‘soft’ policies and practices could help improve regional economic 
performance. 
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Table 1: Indicators of HRM Practices 
(% of workplaces with ‘soft’ HRM practices) 
 
Indicator (soft, hard)     Australia Illawarra 
 
% who have worked here more than 10 years2  31.1  58.1 
% workers on individual contracts (Nil, any)   71.0  73.9 
Use of performance-based pay (no, yes)   63.9  57.7 
Share ownership options for employees (no, yes)  82.5  76.8 
Semi-autonomous work groups (yes, no)   43.0  33.8 
Quality circles (yes, no)     16.0  16.8 
Joint Consultative Committees (yes, no)   41.6  28.0 
Taskforces or Ad hoc committees (yes, no)   45.9  28.5 
Supervisors trained in employee relations    37.5  40.3 
(all or most, some or none)   
Training scheme in place (yes, no)    65.2  72.9 
Bonus scheme in place (no, yes)    63.3  na 
Regular meetings down management line (no, yes)  23.1  31.5 
Employees meet with senior management (yes, no)  38.2  37.5 
Existence of policy on EEO/AA (yes, no)   74.5  54.2 
Existence of paid maternity leave (yes, no)   34.2  27.8 
Existence of OH&S policy (yes, no)   84.5  81.9 
Dismissals (zero, any)     55.8  63.7 
Downsizing with compulsory redundancy (no, yes)  62.1  70.3 
Industrial action by strikes (no, yes)   87.7  82.5 
Negotiate directly with employees on 
• pay rates (no, yes)     48.6  54.4 
• work practices (no, yes)    46.7  47.3 
 
                                                           
2 In Australia, ‘soft’ HRM workplaces are defined as those having above the national average of 3% of the 
workforce.  In the Illawarra, due to coding differences, they are defined as having 11% or more of the 
workforce. 
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Table 2: Objectives of Work Groups / Quality Circles (% yes) 
 
Objective      Australia  Illawarra 
 
To increase productivity/ efficiency / performance  64.2   61.3 
To increase employee responsibility / autonomy  40.9   46.9 
To improve product / service quality   40.8   43.6 
To increase client satisfaction    34.1   39.1 
To increase employee motivation / commitment  33.2   39.2 
To increase job satisfaction    30.5   31.6 
To improve communication    29.9   25.5 
Important for team building    27.7   29.5 
To enhance skill levels     24.8   30.3 
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Table 3: Objectives of Joint Consultative Committee / Taskforces (% yes) 
 
Objective      Australia  Illawarra 
 
Improve communications     56.1   51.6 
Improve efficiency or productivity    50.4   37.1  
Assist in implementing change    34.2   36.2 
Increase job satisfaction / employee moral   32.8   26.8 
Improve quality of service or product   29.0   30.4 
Reduce disputes      22.2   18.9 
Help introduce new technology    14.9   14.6 
Reduce labour turnover     10.4     9.5 
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Table 4: Impact of Alternative Managerial Attitudes on Labour Productivity 
 
Indicator   Australia   Illawarra 
 
Intercept   -0.894    -1.216  
(-11.243)   (-3.707) 
 
Management- employee  0.259    -0.096 
Relationship   (2.574)***   (-0.268) 
 
Quality improvements  0.087    0.646 
more important   (0.795)    (1.715)* 
 
Investment in human  0.406    0.375 
resources    (3.652)***   (0.953) 
 
Prefer to deal directly  -0.004    -0.686 
with employees   (-0.041)    (-1.688)* 
 
*  Significant at 90% level 
**  Significant at 95% level 
***  Significant at 99% level. 
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Table 5: Impact of Employment Policies and Practices on Labour Productivity 
 
Indicator   Australia   Illawarra 
 
Intercept   -1.514     -3.794   
    (-5.586)    ( -3.339)   
 
Employment   -0.102     0.556   
stability    (-0.914)    ( 1.400)*   
 
Supervisor trained  0.020     0.274    
In ER    ( 0.191)    ( 0.712)  
 
EEO policies    0.551    0.559   
    ( 3.777)***   (1.272)  
 
Maternity leave    0.292    -0.123   
    ( 2.675)***   (-0.264)  
 
OH&S policies   0.302    -0.137   
    (1.625)*    (-0.254)  
 
No terminations   -0.009    -0.611   
    (-0.084)    (-1.590)*  
 
No strikes    0.338    1.641   
    ( 2.121)**   ( 2.500)***   
 
No individual    0.133     0.304   
contracts   ( 1.138)*   ( 0.661)   
 
No performance   -0.305    0.032   
based payments   (-2.806)***   (0.080)  
 
No share   -0.097    0.796   
ownership schemes  (-0.711)    (1.370)  
 
 
*  Significant at 90% level 
**  Significant at 95% level 
***  Significant at 99% level. 
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Table 6: Impact of Presence of Participation Mechanisms on Labour Productivity 
 
Mechanism    Australia   Illawarra 
 
Intercept    -0.818    -1.164 
     (-6.149)    (-2.138) 
 
Workgroup     0.164     0.480 
     (1.464)*    (1.014) 
 
Quality circle     0.389    -0.392 
     (3.015)***   (-0.791) 
 
Joint consultative    -0.093    -0.115 
committee    (-0.834)    (-0.249) 
 
Taskforce or ad hoc    0.146    0.410 
committee    (1.291)*    (-0.023) 
 
None of the above   -0.818     0.047 
     (-0.391)    (-0.076) 
 
*  Significant at 90% level 
**  Significant at 95% level 
***  Significant at 99% level. 
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Table 7: Impact of Objective for Establishing Workgroup or Quality Circle on 
Labour Productivity 
 
Objective     Australia  Illawarra 
 
Intercept     -0.791   -1.101 
      (-6.912)   (-2.729) 
 
Direct objectives 
Increase customer / client satisfaction   0.057   -0.322 
(0.358) (-0.387) 
 
Improve quality of product / service  -0.152    0.208 
      (-0.982)   (0.343) 
 
Indirect objectives 
Increase employee responsibilities / autonomy -0.244    0.550 
      (-1.568)*  (0.794) 
 
Team-building      0.339   -0.012 
      (1.802)**  (-0.017) 
 
Increase employee motivation and    0.465   -0.517 
commitment     (2.786)***  (-0.540) 
 
Enhance skill levels     0.179    0.280 
(0.973) (0.345) 
 
Increase job satisfaction     0.353    0.032 
      (1.977)**  (0.033) 
 
Improve communication    -0.097   -0.818 
      (-0.558)   (-0.719) 
 
*  Significant at 90% level 
**  Significant at 95% level 
***  Significant at 99% level. 
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